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MENTAL DISORDERS AND THE “SYSTEM OF
JUDGMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY”
ANITA L. ALLEN∗

I.
“Any long period of insanity or deep compulsive obsession ruins a life.”1
Justice for Hedgehogs is a big book about one big thing: the truth of “living
well and being good.”2 Dworkin maintains that “people each have a general,
foundational responsibility to live well, to make something of their lives, and
that living well is a matter of making appropriate decisions over one’s life.”3
Acting responsibly means acting in a principled way. It is a virtue.4 People
who might otherwise be responsible are compromised by self-interest, by being
pulled in two directions at once (moral “schizophrenia”), and by failing to
apply applicable principles across all categories of reflection (moral
“compartmentalization”).5
People who might otherwise act responsibly are also compromised by the
conditions popularly and imprecisely referred to as mental disease, mental
illness, mental disorder, being crazy, and insanity. The percentage of people in
the United States assigned one of these labels is strikingly large.6 It is
surprising that moral philosophers do not have more to say – descriptively,
analytically, and normatively – about the moral lives and responsibilities of
persons affected by mental conditions. For his part, Dworkin states that
serious, persistent mental disorder can undercut responsibility and “ruins a
life.”7
Like most philosophers of moral and ethical responsibility, Dworkin
concentrates on “normal” adult men and women. However, in Dworkin’s
∗

Deputy Dean and Henry R. Silverman Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy,
University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010) (Apr. 17, 2009
manuscript at 143, on file with the Boston University Law Review).
2 Id. (manuscript at 138).
3 Id.
4 Id. (manuscript at 67).
5 Id. (manuscript at 68).
6 See Press Release, National Institute of Mental Health, Mental Illness Exacts Heavy
Toll, Beginning in Youth (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/sciencenews/2005/mental-illness-exacts-heavy-toll-beginning-in-youth.shtml.
7 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 143).
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chapter entitled “Free Will and Responsibility,” Dworkin seems to take a
special interest in psychiatric pathology.8 Dworkin draws numerous contrasts
between normal adults and people who fall into other categories, including
children, idiots (Dworkin’s term), the brain damaged, the insane, and
psychopaths.9
Dworkin places children and persons with what he calls “serious mental
illnesses” in an exceptional category, laboring over the reasons for doing so –
reasons it falls to his readers to assess.10 Indeed, his interpretation of children
and persons affected by mental illness as lacking certain creative epistemic and
regulative capacities, as opposed to being driven by outside hydraulic forces,
plays a key role in his effort to show that determinism is not a threat to
regarding normal adults as responsible.11 Ultimately, readers have to ask
whether Dworkin’s understandings of mental conditions, responsibility in the
context of mental conditions, and the distinction between (1) lacking a
epistemic and regulative capacity and (2) being driven by causal forces from
the outside are clear, correct, and complete. I begin that task here.
II.
“We do not regard someone as suffering from mental disease if his cognitive
and regulative capacities fall only somewhat short of what we take to be
normal. They must be low indeed.”12
My concern for philosophical accounts of responsibility in the context of
mental conditions is prompted by three things. First, government studies
suggest that mental conditions are exceedingly prevalent.13 Second, with
increased openness about mental health, we are learning that mental conditions
strike people from all walks of life, including practicing lawyers and judges
who shoulder major responsibilities for securing legal services and legal
justice. Third, as personal memoirs chronicling mental conditions reveal,
intelligent people affected by mental conditions have inner lives in which
concerns about personal virtue, moral capacity, moral compliance, moral
accountability, and moral repair can loom large. Philosophers have tended to
stereotype and short-change the ethical and moral experiences of people
affected by mild and serious mental conditions.
A federally funded study by the National Institute of Mental Health
(“NIMH”) suggested that at least twenty-six percent of the general population
8

Id. (manuscript at 137-60).
See id.
10 See id.
11 See id. (manuscript at 146).
12 Id. (manuscript at 159).
13 Dworkin’s “we” ordinary people, contrasted with “they,” the persons with mental
conditions, refers to something of a chimera. Lots of “us” are “them.”
9
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suffers from a diagnosable mental disorder each year.14 The twenty-six
percent figure was conservative, however. It was based on a survey of
English-speaking American households and did not poll homeless,
hospitalized, or institutionalized people.15 Nor did it count “some rare and
complex psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism.”16 The
NIMH figures corroborate a controversial report of the United States Surgeon
General, which placed the annual rate of mental illness in America at
approximately twenty percent.17
The group affected by mental disorders includes the high functioning
professionals we rely on. Our lawyers, judges, physicians, and politicians all
experience mental illnesses. Although, as mental health memoir writer
Elizabeth Wurtzel points out, “The measure of our mindfulness, the touchstone
for sanity in this society, is our level of productivity, our attention to
responsibility, our ability to plain and simple hold down a job.”18 Major
responsibilities shouldered in ordinary life merely place limits on “how much
rope” high functioning people with mental conditions have to hang
themselves.19
Among lawyers and judges, mental conditions, including drug and alcohol
dependency, are commonplace.20 Sometimes, lawyers and judges with mental
problems run afoul of the very law they are sworn to uphold. Consider
Stephen Thompson, the once-respected New Jersey judge whose posttraumatic stress disorder was a factor in his decision to have sex with a young
boy and collect child pornography;21 or Sol Wachter, the Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals who became a stalker after the medication he took
induced bipolar disorder.22
Depression is also common among lawyers. Katharine Graham wrote about
her brilliant husband Philip, whose suicide associated with bipolar depression
occurred following a remarkable career as a Harvard Law School graduate,
Supreme Court law clerk, and controlling owner of Newsweek, the Washington
14

Press Release, National Institute of Mental Health, supra note 6.
See id.
16 Id.
17 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 46 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/
H/S/_/nnbbhs.pdf.
18 ELIZABETH WURTZEL, PROZAC NATION: YOUNG AND DEPRESSED IN AMERICA 48 (First
Replica Books 1999) (1994).
19 Id.
20 See Rick B. Allen, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Lawyers, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265,
265-66 (1997).
21 See Toni Callas, Jury Split on Judge’s Insanity Defense, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 1,
2005, at B01.
22 See Diana Jean Schemo, A Prison Term of 15 Months for Wachtler, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 1993, at B1; Judge Not, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, July 1, 1997,
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199707/judge-not.
15
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Post, and numerous radio and television stations.23 Schizophrenia is also not
unheard of among successful lawyers. Professor Elyn Saks has written about
her exemplary achievements, including attending law school, practicing law,
and earning tenure on a law faculty, while struggling with schizophrenia.24
We cannot summarily exclude people with mental problems out of the
universe of moral agents, reducing them to the status of rocks, trees, animals,
and infants, whether to denigrate them or to protect them from moral and legal
wrath, as Michael Moore long ago tried to do in a well-meaning response to
Thomas Szasz.25 Nor can we include the group on the false assumption that
their moral lives are precisely like the paradigmatic moral lives of the
epistemically-sound and well-regulated people never personally touched by a
mental condition. The published memoirs, diaries, and correspondences of
people who have experienced serious mental illness reveal rich inner ethical
lives and social lives that combine impressive moral successes with
devastating moral failures.
III.
“We believe that living well requires that we create not just a chronology but
a narrative that weaves together values of character, loyalties ambitions,
desires, tastes and ideals. No one creates a narrative of perfect integrity: we .
. . act out of character sometimes.”26
The internal lives of persons with mental conditions are often active
narratives of moral and ethical engagement, full of questions and discernment.
We know this because we have the benefit of the psychiatric memoir literature,
whose contributors range from the sublime William Styron27 to former
Massachusetts First Lady, Kitty Dukakis.28
Who am I? Am I the person who self-improves and self-destructs, helps and
harms others?
•

23

“I have two identities. Essentially, one is good, one is bad. . . . I
really don’t like hurting people. If I inadvertently do, it’s always

See generally KATHARINE GRAHAM, PERSONAL HISTORY (1997).
See generally ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD (2007).
25 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 15581 (1984) (arguing that mental illness is not a myth and thus that the search for the line
between the “bad and the sick” must continue).
26 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 154-55).
27 See generally WILLIAM STYRON, DARKNESS VISIBLE: A MEMOIR OF MADNESS (1990).
28 See generally KITTY DUKAKIS WITH JANE SCOVELL, NOW YOU KNOW (1990).
24
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followed by huge tidal waves of guilt. And even if by chance it’s on
purpose, it always makes me feel awful, so I do it as little as I can.”29
•

“Both my manias and depressions had violent sides to them.
Violence, especially if you are a woman, is not something spoken
about with ease. Being wildly out of control – physically assaultive,
screaming insanely at the top of one’s lungs, running frenetically with
no purpose or limit, or impulsively trying to leap from cars – is
frightening to others and unspeakably terrifying to oneself.”30

Are my actions, desires, preferences, and habits a matter of pathology or
personality? Am I in control or is mania in control?
•

“And my sex life . . . well . . . I was a single person, and I got into
what I guess we call free love. I certainly didn’t know it then, but,
looking back, I see this as another part of the mania.”31

•

“I told her about my drug and alcohol abuse, sleepless nights, poor
class attendance, my inability to focus, reckless driving, starving
myself, and hyperactivity. . . .
That began our four-year
therapist/client relationship. . . . The mania also transformed me into
an extremely outgoing and sociable character. Fueled by drugs and
alcohol, I constantly socialized and partied, avoiding the possibility of
sliding into a dreaded depression.”32

Am I accountable? What should I do to make amends? How can I know I
am well enough to make meaningful apologies?
•

“I fear I am like some deep-sea animal, who cannot rise quickly to the
surface without excess decompression. In any event my rise has been
slow. . . . Now I wish to say that I have thought through the situation.
. . . 1) I wish to apologize fully. 2) My behavior was inhumane and
unpardonable.”33

Modern philosophers often seem to assume all people with serious mental
disorders lack ethical and moral capacity and because of it, moral or legal

29

DANIELLE STEEL, HIS BRIGHT LIGHT: THE STORY OF NICK TRAINA 93 (1998) (quoting
musician Nick Traina).
30 KAY REDFIELD JAMISON, AN UNQUIET MIND 120 (1995).
31 PATTY DUKE WITH GLORIA HOCHMAN, A BRILLIANT MADNESS 19 (paperback ed.
1993).
32 ANDY BEHRMAN, ELECTROBOY 20, 22 (2002).
33 GRAHAM, supra note 23, at 303 (quoting Philip Graham).
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culpability.34 But philosophers rarely bother to define precisely who counts as
having the sort of mental condition that undercuts moral capacity. Dworkin
doubts that “psychopaths,” “addicts,” and “compulsives” “act” at all. And
even when philosophers acknowledge ethical and moral capacity among
people affected by mental conditions, they then fail to incorporate the varieties
of ethical and moral engagement common to mental disorder into their
accounts of normative life.
At any given moment, America’s mentally troubled are invisibly integrated
into the moral fabric of society, whether philosophers choose to deal with that
fact or not. They function as participants in the ethics of care, concern, and
practical responsibility. It is worth considering whether the fact that Dworkin
is writing in an era of heightened awareness of the pervasiveness of mental
disorders and intellectual disabilities makes a difference in how he
conceptualizes judgmental responsibility. A society with a formative agenda
of cultivating character excellence cannot simply ignore the existence of
mental disorders.
IV.
“We ordinary people have no reason to think that a crazy person’s decisions
have any less – or any more – causal independence or originality than our
own.”35
People with mental conditions are stock characters in moral philosophy.36
They are dramatis personae with bit roles. They are brought in as specimens to
make a point, not to be part of the conversation.37 Philosophers typically
introduce people with mental conditions at the point in laying down a moral
theory when they believe they must acknowledge that there are exceptions to
the otherwise proud and universal ascription of moral responsibility to adult
members of the human family.
Does Justice for Hedgehogs follow this regrettable pattern? People affected
by mental conditions first appear in Dworkin’s chapter entitled “Free Will and
Responsibility,” in which Dworkin focuses on the proper ascription of a
dimension of living well and being good that he refers to as “judgmental
responsibility.”38 Judgmental responsibility is an ethical and moral capacity:
“Someone has judgmental responsibility for an act if it is appropriate to hold

34

See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF FREE WILL WORTH
WANTING 45 (1984).
35 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 151).
36 See, e.g., DENNETT, supra note 34, at 157 (“We also find it plausible to judge that
nonhuman animals, infants, and those who are severely handicapped mentally are not
responsible at all.”).
37 See id.
38 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 137-60).
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him responsible for it: to blame him or praise him for it.”39 Judgmental
responsibility is, it seems, part of the “freedom, reason and/or feeling” package
philosophers traditionally refer to as “moral agency.”
Judgmental
responsibility is something Dworkin wants badly to ascribe to as many people
as possible to dignify and motivate them; but he implicitly assumes certain
marginal populations stand in the way. So he puzzles over the “exceptions” he
refers to as “idiots” and “psychopaths.”40
How can anyone – sane or insane – be responsible for their actions if those
actions are not “free” but “determined” by forces beyond their control?
The discipline of moral philosophy has established a drill. Before a
philosopher can ascribe moral and ethical responsibility to individuals, he or
she must first prove that either individuals possess freedom of will or that
freedom of will does not matter. Accordingly, in a big book about living well,
Dworkin would be expected to tackle the classic “free will versus
determinism” problem before advancing a conception of ethical and moral
responsibility. And so he does.
Now, determinism is a scientific theory holding that every “decision[],
reflective as well as unreflective, is fully determined by processes and events
that precede it and lie outside the control of the decider.”41 Epiphenomenalism
is the scientific claim that the “causal chain that ends in movements of nerve
and muscle” does not include decisions at all.42 Decisions, which may appear
to a person as prompting action, are “epiphenomena” of external processes and
events.43
Some philosophers (the “incompatibilists”44) have argued that moral
responsibility ascriptions would be false or pointless if either determinism or
epiphenomenalism were true. Dworkin offers an end run around the threat to
responsibility seemingly posed by determinism and its teammate,
epiphenomenalism, with his own unique compatibilism.
Dworkin argues that neither determinism nor epiphenomenalism is a
We can meaningfully ascribe
personal responsibility showstopper.45
judgmental responsibility to normal adult men and women and to many youths
and people with mental disorders, even if determinism and epiphenomenalism
are scientifically true. This argument relies on his trademark interpretative
turn.
For Dworkin, judgmental responsibility is an “interpretative concept” whose
point and value is relevant to its understanding and application.46 Embracing
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. (manuscript at 139).
Id. (manuscript at 150-53).
Id. (manuscript at 137).
Id.
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 141).
See id. (manuscript at 137-60).
Id. (manuscript at 139).
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judgmental responsibility is a better ethical fit with the overall fabric of our
lives than rejecting it on account of scientific determinism or
epiphenomenalism. A “responsibility system” exists in our lives, and we
“must try to justify as well as we can.”47
The responsibility system ascribes judgmental responsibility to a person not
just in case the person is scientifically free, but if he or she (1) has a minimal
ability to form true beliefs about the world, other people’s mental states, and
the likely consequences of what they do; and (2) the ability to make decisions
that fit “the agent’s normative personality: his desires, preferences,
convictions, attachments, loyalties and self image.”48 These are epistemic and
regulative capacities, respectively.
We do hold people accountable and we also make moral judgments about
right and wrong, Dworkin maintains. We have an “internal sense of deliberate
action”;49 we have a sense of pushing and being pushed and we make a
distinction between the two, he says.50 Scientific possibilities provide no basis
for an individual to cease his or her ethical quest to live well, which includes
asking, “Am I responsible for what I decided to do?” Dworkin’s ethical
subject views herself as a decider, a person with reasons for acting and a
person who views others as having reasons for acting.51
Dworkin’s attack on determinism includes an argument that people cannot
coherently believe that scientific perspectives like determinism undercut
responsibility. Such a belief’s “annihilating power is catholic across
reasons.”52 If determinism were true and meant we have no judgmental
responsibility then “we are all – hurricanes and people – just carried on
nature’s sea.”53 The best fitting conception of responsibility does not allow
scientific possibilities to undercut the practice of praising or blaming ourselves
and others. Determinism and epiphenomenalism are technically consistent
with, but psychologically in tension with, the general practice of giving reasons
and the specific ethical practice of giving reasons – “the responsibility system”
which “[o]ur culture has handed us.”54
With the threats of determinism and epiphenomenalism out of the way,
Dworkin forges ahead to elaborate judgmental responsibility. When is it
appropriate for someone to judge his or her own behavior critically (as a matter
of personal ethics) and for others to judge him or her that way (as a matter of
moral evaluation)? Judgmental responsibility is appropriately ascribed when a

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. (manuscript at 143).
Id.
Id.
Note that people with mental illness have this internal sense of deliberate action, too.
See DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 145).
Id. (manuscript at 141).
Id.
Id. (manuscript at 154).

2010]

MENTAL ILLNESS & JUDGMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

629

combination of capacities is obtained – a minimal ability to form true beliefs,
understand consequences and act reliably in accord with personality.
An understanding of judgmental responsibility may have implications for
law, but clearly, Dworkin’s “judgmental responsibility” is not the same thing
as ordinary legal responsibility. The law sometimes, for policy reasons,
assigns legal responsibility to natural persons who are not judgmentally
responsible or fully judgmentally responsible simply because they have caused
harm. For example, a person utterly and permanently deluded as to reality by
schizophrenia can he held liable for intentional torts as if they were perfectly
sane.55 Moreover, the law, for policy reasons, assigns legal responsibility to
entities who, as non-natural persons, cannot be ascribed judgmental
responsibility at all. For example, a court, under the doctrine of vicarious
liability, held that a corporation serving in the role of general contractor on a
construction project can be legally responsible for harms caused by the
employee of an undercapitalized sub-contractor.56 Judgmental responsibility,
like moral agency, makes human beings special and confers importance and
dignity. Sadly, not all human beings have judgmental responsibility. Their
importance stems from other morally relevant potential, traits, and
relationships.
V.
“We are not responsible when someone pushes us or manipulates our mind . . .
. But we are also not responsible when we are small children or seriously
mentally ill.”57
Challenged by their disorders and illnesses, persons afflicted with mental
conditions struggle to conform to basic societal expectations of right as
opposed to wrong, virtue as opposed to vice, good as opposed to evil, and
justice as opposed to injustice. They may be especially unlikely to succeed.
How should persons with mental illness respond to moral failure in their
personal lives; ethical failure in their professional lives? And conversely, what
special pride ought they take in their successes?
Do persons with mental conditions possess judgmental responsibility? I
believe most do, most of the time, and that only a very few of the people to
whom DSM-IV diagnoses could be applied do not at all.58
Dworkin’s account of judgmental responsibility, his “adverbial” ethics,
shifts toward the narrative/internal/creative and away from the

55

See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961).
See Becker v. Interstate Props., 569 F.2d 1203, 1209, 1214-15 (3d Cir. 1977).
57 DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 150).
58 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS, at xxi-xxiii (4th ed. 1994).
56
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executive/causal/external/hydraulic.59
This is good news for moral
philosophers looking for a normative framework within which to explain why,
and in what way, people with mental illnesses are moral agents. People with
symptoms of bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, obsessive compulsive
disorder, dissociative identity disorder, schizophrenia, and the like are creative
actors, narrative builders. They are intelligent; they are not robots. They are
not the people Dworkin indelicately terms “idiots” who do not know that guns
kill.60 Yet the narratives of responsibility shaping Dworkin’s interpretation of
responsible actors are the narratives of mental wellness not mental disorder or
illness.
Mental disorders are not a marginal phenomenon, meriting a parenthetical or
a footnote in ethics books. There can be no adequate theory of moral agency
or of “judgmental responsibility” that omits a perspective on the moral and
ethical capacities and responsibilities of persons affected by mental disorders.
When should we blame? What is an excuse? What, if anything, do people
affected by mental illness owe the people they harm? What special ethical and
moral obligations of prudence, of warning, of advance directives, if any,
pertain to people with mentally disorders? Philosophers have plenty of work
to do on such questions before getting to questions of ideal legal responsibility,
such as whether people with mental disorders are liable for intentional torts,
negligence, crimes, and commercial breaches. Philosophers of value should
spend more time than most traditionally have spent fleshing out the moral and
ethical responsibilities of people affected by mental disorders.
High-functioning people who are ill with bipolar disorder, major unipolar
depression, schizophrenia, and other DSM-IV mental illnesses have rich and
difficult moral lives. Often educated, well-brought up, and well-employed,
people with mental illnesses typically know right from wrong. Yet sometimes
they do the wrong thing. They hit, lie, cheat, brag, extort, bribe, abuse, and
molest. Many of their most hurtful, damaging, and illegal acts seem to be a
direct result of illnesses that unleash negative impulses and distort judgment.
But bad behavior is not the only problem. Persons affected by mental illness
may suffer from low self-esteem; they may inappropriately judge and criticize
themselves.
The biographies and autobiographies of persons diagnosed with mental
illness reveal individuals who sometimes succeed at meeting their
responsibilities and who sometimes fail. When they fail, mentally troubled
people of all ages and many walks of life experience deep, even debilitating,
guilt, shame, and remorse. Actress Patty Duke has written that after losing
control of emotions in front of her family, she often felt overcome with
pathological degrees of shame: “Now I had to run to the bathroom and try to
kill myself because that was the only way to save face.”61 For their misdeeds,
59
60
61

DWORKIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 124).
Id. (manuscript at 141).
DUKE, supra note 31, at 236.
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they apologize, pay compensation, and submit to shunning and criminal
punishment. Thus, people with mental illness combine active, rich inner moral
lives with public accountability within the “responsibility system.”
People with mental illness can be excessively “good,” religious, or exacting
– to a fault. For example, the insane delusions of Margery Kempe led her to
reject worldliness and adopt a religious life.62 Similarly, Foucault tells the
story of Glenadel, a “polite” man who begged to be chained down to prevent
him from carrying out an impulse to murder his sister-in-law.63 Sigmund
Freud observed that some of his manic-depressive patients blamed themselves
and refused to blame themselves to a pathological extent.64 Freud diagnosed
what are now called “mood” or “affective” disorders in some of his patients
and was fascinated by their implications for morality. “It is a most remarkable
experience to see morality,” he wrote in 1933, “which is supposed to have been
given to us by God and thus deeply implanted in us, functioning [in these
patients] as a periodic phenomenon.”65 Freud observed that during periods of
normalcy, his patients were morally balanced.66 They recognized right and
wrong and could generally make accurate, socially acceptable judgments.67
However “melancholy” or depressed patients were, their over-severe superegos tended to heap undeserved blame on themselves.68 Freud’s ego-driven
“maniac” or manic patients were amoral, tending toward uninhibited
gratification of immoral desires.69
VI.
“A toddler or idiot or madman makes decisions and makes them, perhaps,
with some sense of responsibility for them. But he should reject judgmental
responsibility for those decisions later, when he grows or if he recovers, and
the rest of us should reject them now. We think – and the toddler, at least, will
later come to think – that it would be right not to count those decisions in
deciding how well he has lived. If we accept the creative principle as the
ethical basis for our responsibility system we can await the latest discoveries

62

ROY PORTER, MADNESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 173-77 (2002).
MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE 1974-1975, at
143-45 (Arnold I. Davidson ed., Graham Burchell trans., Picador 2003) (1999).
64 See SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 60-61
(James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1933).
65 Id. at 61 (alterations in original).
66 Id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id.
63
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about the electro-dynamics of our brains with boundless curiosity but no
terror.”70
Suppose a well-educated and gainfully employed adult storms into a friend’s
apartment during an episode of bipolar rage, smashes a framed work of art to
the floor, and assaults the friend with a shard of glass. Should she blame her
own behavior critically and should others judge her that way? Following
Dworkin, the offender is judgmentally responsible if she has the capacity to
recognize truth, comprehend consequences, and act in accord with normative
personality. The adult who has had a bipolar rage attack is someone who
probably satisfies the epistemic prong of judgmental responsibility; but not, on
the occasion of the attack, the regulative prong.
We can imagine, though, that overwhelmingly, the person does act in accord
with normative personality sufficient for judgmental responsibility’s regulative
prong. She could be like Kay Jamison, the successful bipolar medical school
professor. The interplay of inner life and public accountability is movingly
displayed on the pages of Dr. Jamison’s autobiographical best-seller, An
Unquiet Mind.71 Jamison writes of madness and recovery, aided by supportive
friends, family, and lithium. A professor at Johns Hopkins University, Jamison
described how suicide attempts are “deeply bruising” to the people who care
about you.72 Concerns about hurting others mix easily in her writing with
concerns about self-concept and identity. Notably, Jamison wrote of how
bruising it is for the mentally ill to live with the “discrepancies between what
one is, what one is brought up to believe is the right way of behaving toward
others, and what actually happens” while ill.73
We must therefore reject understanding judgmental responsibility as a
matter of development or degree. Judgmental responsibility has another axis.
Further complicating this inquiry is the reality that it is also a distinctly
episodic phenomenon. It is a set of traits that can come and go. The set can
come and go rapidly and frequently, as it might for the people psychiatrists
diagnose as having rapid-cycling bipolar disorders and/or intermittent
explosive disorder. Or it can come and go occasionally, as it might for people
whose affective disorders erupt once or twice in their lives and are otherwise
well-controlled by lifestyle, medication, and therapy.
Failing to recognize the distinct episodic quality of ethical and moral
capacity (and the brands of moral engagement it precipitates precisely because
it is episodic) is a mistake. The mistake prompts philosophers to class adult
persons affected by mental illness with children. But children’s internal
narratives and mental illness-affected adults’ ethical narratives are worlds
apart. Children have yet to experience reliable epistemic and regulative
70
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competence; and to have complex work, family, and public service lives builtup around them. For an adult, the lack of epistemic and/or regulative capacity
is often a matter of “losing it” and being saddled with all the practical
consequences of falling short.
VII.
“Would I think myself responsible, in retrospect, if I had the kind of incapacity
the defendant’s act revealed? That is the spirit of the attractive thought,
‘There but for the grace of God go I.’”74
The ideal moral agent will avoid lying, cheating, stealing, promise breaking,
unfairness, injustice, abuse, and violence. Histories of psychiatry reveal that
Westerners used to consider mental illness a spiritual defect or a per se defect
of character.75 It is neither. Mental health professionals recognize that poor
moral and ethical judgment may be a result of very real, treatable abnormalities
of brain chemistry and function.76 Mental health interventions are enablers of
better ethical living and moral goodness. The availability of such interventions
means that neither brief nor extended bouts of mental illness inevitably ruin
lives.
How should persons with mental illness respond to moral failure in their
personal lives; ethical failure in their professional lives? And conversely, what
special pride ought they take in their successes?
Consider Jeremy (not his real name), a man over fifty with two master’s
degrees. He supports his three teenage children by teaching full time in a
public elementary school in New York City and selling his own high-quality
original artwork. A father, teacher, and artist, Jeremy’s life is hardly a
“ruined” life.
Yet Jeremy is seriously mentally ill. Jeremy lives with memories of a father
who repeatedly beat him and raped his sisters in earshot of a mother
immobilized by morbid obesity. Since childhood, he has cycled through bouts
of catatonic sadness and energetic, selfish pleasure-seeking. Jeremy has been
violently aggressive; more often suicidal. Once, he flung himself through a
third-story window and spent a month in the hospital. He is well when in
therapy and medicated with a cocktail of mood-stabilizers, anticonvulsants,
antidepressants, and second-generation antipsychotics. He prefers the tremors,
sexual dysfunction, and other side effects of medication to the emotional
extremes he experiences without them.
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Mental illness can lead people to feel awful and to do awful things.
Contrary to popular stereotypes, however, the sober mentally ill population is
not a special threat to the community. Yet, poor judgment, irritability, abuse,
and violence are hallmarks of major mental disturbances. Even though an
individual knows what is morally right and has a firm foundation of moral
education, it may be impossible to do the right thing when mental illness
strikes. Moreover, mental illness can cause a person to act out of character.
Because the mentally ill often wish to be morally compliant members of their
communities, their ethical failings can be a source of considerable regret and
shame.
When assessing his responsibility for his outrageous assaults and property
damage, Jeremy cannot say, “There, but for the grace of God, go I.” He must
say, “Despite the grace of God, here I am.” He must assess his own epistemic
and regulative capacities. He must wonder if he is in control or if he is a
tumbleweed. Jeremy believes his regulative capacities are impaired and that it
is a medical problem prescription drugs can relieve. But he also believes he is
driven, willy-nilly, to behave badly by genetic inheritance from his
schizophrenic father and childhood abuse. The internal dialogue combines the
creative and the hydraulic.
VIII.
“[Y]ou must treat the success of your own life as of intrinsic and objective
importance.”77
People with mental illness are often written out of the ethics game or given a
bum script. We should acknowledge their actual roles and their potential. If
everyone is crazy, is anyone to blame? Moralism is always a risk when
dealing with illness, but I believe praise and blame very often apply to the
conduct and characters of people with mental illnesses. We must encourage
greater respect for the moral potential and contributions of people with mental
illness, through identifying realms of moral responsibility and legal liability
that properly – and improperly – apply to them.
It is not always clear what greater respect means. What modes of
accountability are fitting? What is a morally committed person obligated to do
to address the fallout of hurt feelings and injury caused by his or her mental
illnesses? Should society hold individuals morally accountable when chronic
or short-term mental disability distorts their judgments about right and wrong?
People who suffer from mental illness typically look and act normally. We
may be disinclined to shelter them from blame the way we shelter the mentally
retarded. The Supreme Court has held that criminal offenders with IQs below
seventy may not be put to death.78 Yet contemporary United States laws
77
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sternly impose criminal and civil liability on high-functioning mentally ill
persons all the time.
For what are you responsible when you are perfectly intelligent and yet
illness makes you irresponsible? After a manic rage or a messy suicide
attempt, what do the high-functioning mentally ill owe the people they may
have offended, harmed, or worried? Dworkin suggests people with mental
illness owe nothing for the wrong they do when ill. Yet we can imagine
alternative schools of thought. A “full accountability” school would say: the
mentally ill owe complete apologies and compensation for the wrong they do,
to the extent that they recover from mental illness and are capable of
performing moral repair. They should face the same punishments and liability
as everyone else. The “partial accountability” school says: the mentally ill
have an obligation to try to seek and follow medical advice, but otherwise only
to offer brief factual explanations of illness-caused injuries. They should not
be subject to the same criminal and civil burdens as ordinary people. Both
schools of thought purport to recognize the humanity of the mentally ill in
different ways. The full accountability approach does so by treating the ill no
differently from others who injure; the partial accountability approach by
acknowledging that the ill suffer bona fide disabilities, which are no fault of
their own.
The insane can be good, the sane bad. No one can help some degree of
moral failure. With or without fault, the mentally ill sometimes cannot meet
basic conventional expectations of moral behavior. There is much that science
and psychology may one day tell us about the relationship between the brain,
mental health, and behavior. Perhaps one day we will blame less, and do a
much better job of helping the mentally ill control antisocial behaviors.
Being at risk of ethical and moral failure on account of mental conditions
entails special responsibilities of self-care and harm prevention. A person
prone to bipolar mania, for example, is obligated to take reasonable steps to
prevent bouts of acute illness, and, if something akin to the “partial
accountability” approach is the right one, acknowledge hurtful behavior. A
twenty-six percent prevalence rate of mental illness calls for access to moral
and ethical capacity building through access to effective mental health
services. Without access to good physicians, medications, and hospitals,
people with mental illness cannot do what they should. A just society will
assist people adversely affected by mental illness, both as a matter of sound
public health and as a matter of sound ethical policy.
Many people are periodically and intermittently just too sick to do the right
thing. Anxiety, depression, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia get in the way
of conforming to basic standards of moral conduct. Challenged by their
illness, persons afflicted with mental illness struggle to conform to basic
societal expectations of right as opposed to wrong, virtue as opposed to vice,
good as opposed to evil, and justice as opposed to injustice. They may be
especially unlikely to succeed.
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Society has done little to help them. Moral educators have not worked
under the assumption of widespread mental disorders and diseases in the past.
Yet the data suggest that a high percentage of the bright children and teens, to
whom we are trying to teach values in high school and college, may be
Mental health
struggling with problems of mood and judgment.79
professionals today recognize that poor moral judgment may be a result of very
real, treatable abnormalities of brain chemistry and function.80 Mental illness
is too common among the general population to overlook or to marginalize the
issues of moral compliance, moral accountability, and societal obligation.
With access to therapy, medical care, and social services, even people with
serious mental illnesses, like Jeremy, can hope to survive to live what are on
balance ethically and morally worthy lives.
IX.
“Did the accused lack one or the other of the pertinent capacities to such a
degree that it is inappropriate to ascribe responsibility to him?”81
The law books are full enough of stories of men and women who live
basically normal lives, but who, at some point or intermittently, damage
property, engage in vice, or hurt other people through negligence or aggression
because they are mentally ill. People whom mental illness does not affect
make mistakes of reason. But mentally ill persons, even the very intelligent
and well intended, cannot always recognize which choices are decent and best.
Their intermittent incapacities neither reduce their human dignity nor relieve
them as thinking, creative, narrative-building subjects from the responsibility
system that often ignores their special challenges and experiences.
“Normal” people commonly ignore the demands of conscience and
conventional morality. People experiencing acute mental illness may fail to
hear the genuine demands of conscience or see the value in conventional
morality. Florid mania and psychotic delusions can lead to bad, even
dangerous and deadly, choices. Depression, anxiety, and obsessions can lead
to mistakes of action and inaction.
•
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•

Depressed after his wife’s death from lupus, Ronald Gossage began
taking the medications Xanax and Prozac. He shot two women in
their home, denying any memory of the event. He was convicted of
“assault under extreme emotional disturbance” and sentenced to six
years in prison.83

•

A forty-one year old “John Doe” with schizophrenia was evicted from
his rented apartment, after skipping his medication and becoming
psychotic. While psychotic, he spray-painted the stove, radiator, and
windowsills of his apartment and then damaged a neighbor’s front
door with a hammer.84

•

Margie Wodarz left the scene of one automobile collision, only to
cause another more serious collision a few minutes later. Witnesses
said her behavior at the scene of the accidents was “bizarre.” Wodarz
said she “wigged out.” She explained that her family had “a history of
mental problems” and conjectured that she “just freaked out.”85

•

Erma Veith was driving down the road when suddenly it seemed to
her that God took hold of the steering wheel. She stepped on the gas
when she saw a truck coming in her direction. She believed she could
fly like Batman. The driver of the truck was seriously injured and
sued. A psychiatrist testified that “Veith was suffering from
‘schizophrenic reaction, paranoid type, acute’” at the time of the
collision.86

These things can happen. You can hurt people while mentally ill. Or, you
may simply hurt yourself, sleeping too much to the point of utter debilitation.
You may abuse drugs or alcohol and waste your money. While ill, you may
commit the ultimate act of self-injury: suicide.
•
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had recently gotten an abortion, and her boyfriend had announced he
had impregnated another girl.87
•

A woman, called G.D. in court records, took a lethal dose of the
prescription medication Elavil, obtained with the help of her
stepfather, through a physician who did not know her. Her husband
sued the stepfather and the doctor, alleging both that the physician’s
negligence and the stepfather’s history of abusing his stepdaughter
were the true causes of the suicide.88

Most people, whether or not they have a mental disorder, are capable of
moral feeling and caring about themselves. A few people with mental illness
are incapable of caring much about their futures or other people. These few
seem cut off from ordinary human feeling and emotion, which is so key to
genuine moral commitments and action. They seem oddly indifferent to moral
concerns even though they mouth the vocabulary of morality. As Dworkin
points out, if United States criminal defendants are found to have a “mental
disease” they may be able to use an insanity defense to avoid the harshest
punishments.89 In the past, being found to have had knowledge of right and
wrong could mean a person with a mental illness would be denied an insanity
defense.
Patricia Tempest coolly drowned her five-year-old in the bathtub and then
sat down to watch a movie, ate a banana, and waited until her husband came
home.90 Patricia was convicted of first degree murder, despite the testimony of
a psychiatrist that she was suffering from “chronic schizophrenia, acute type”
at the time of the homicide.91 She was not insane in the eyes of the law,
however. She knew right from wrong. When asked why she drowned her son,
she said he was “too demanding” and “got on her nerves.”92 A friendless
recluse, she did not want her outgoing son and husband in her life anymore.93
She told the police that she had first thought of killing her son days earlier.94
This admission was evidence that the killing was an intentional, premeditated
act. She also told the police that she had apologized to her son for causing his
death.95 Her apology to the victim counted as legally good evidence that she
was not insane at the time of the crime.96 She knew exactly what she was
87
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doing. Patricia’s own words did her in with the legal system. But the words
may have been just words, robotic, no real moral performance of
accountability and repair at all.
Mental illness can lead to moral compartmentalization. Heinous crimes are
sometimes committed by people who are seeking, in their own minds, to act in
the best interest of others – certain select others. David Paul Martin, for
example, had a history of poor judgment and poor impulse control.97 One
afternoon in 1991, David and his second wife, Connie Lynn Martin, had a
screaming match.98 Connie screamed that she would like to see David in jail,
and David screamed at Connie for imposing too many chores on their daughter
Brandy.99 David then knocked Connie down and choked her to death.100 After
the killing, David took a shower, gave Brandy and her brother some cash, and
then turned on the television.101 The police arrived and arrested David, who
was indicted for first-degree murder.102 Psychiatrists who performed a courtordered mental examination told the trial court that in their professional
opinion, David was suffering from a mental illness or defect at the time of the
crime – specifically major depression and a dissociative disorder.103 David
was subsequently found guilty of the lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter
and sentenced to five years in jail.104
I would not deny that some few people are too sick for ethics and morality
and cannot be understood as subject to the responsibility system at all. I agree
with Dworkin that “mental illness may savage either or both of the judgmental
capacities in anyone.”105 Like him, I worry whether the law is consistent or
correct in how it regards people with losses of epistemic or regulative capacity,
let alone irresistible impulses or knowledge of right and wrong.106
Because Dworkin’s agenda is preserving the notion of freedom for the sake
of the responsibility system as it applies to normal (“we ordinary”) people, he
stresses that “if we accept that mentally ill criminals should be excused
because they are not responsible,” we need not agree with pessimistic
incompatibilists that “for that reason . . . no one is ever responsible because
everyone is actually in the same position” of being steered by external
hydraulic forces.107 Dworkin would excuse the criminally accused when they
“lack one or the other of the pertinent capacities to such a degree that it is
97
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inappropriate to ascribe responsibility.”108 He endorses capacity-based
approaches (both epistemic and regulative) to the assignment of legal liability
for serious crime. He asserts that American jurisdictions that now limit the
insanity defense to persons with “mental disease[s]” as on the right track, to
the extent that mental diseases are associated with diminished epistemic and
regulative capacities.109
Tennessee, the state that convicted wife-strangler David Paul Martin of
manslaughter rather than first-degree murder, has subsequently made it harder
for defendants claiming mental illness to benefit from an insanity defense, by
establishing a tough burden of proof. I conclude with a footnote from the
court’s opinion in Martin’s appeal describing the change:
At the time of the offense, insanity was a defense to prosecution if “at the
time of such conduct, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the person
lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the
person’s conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1991). If the evidence raised a
reasonable doubt as to the person’s sanity, the burden of proof fell to the
state to establish sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jackson, 890
S.W.2d 436 (Tenn. 1994). Effective July 1, 1995, the law was amended
to provide that the defendant must prove, by “clear and convincing
evidence,” that “as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, [he or
she] was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of [his or her]
acts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (Supp. 1995).110
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